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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
BARTON V. MCFARLAND 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20101031-CA 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for Forgery, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 and False Personal Information, a Class A Misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507(2), in the Second District Court, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue I: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. McFarland to 
prison. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
These issues were not preserved by Mr. McFarland's counsel, consequently, the 
matters should be reviewed for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. IV and XIV, Utah Const. Art. I § 
14, Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 and Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
507(2) (2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 9, 2010 the State filed an information charging the defendant with 
Forgery on June 21,2010. R. 2. On October 14, 2010, the defendant entered a guilty plea 
to Counts 1 and 5 of the information. R. 58. Counts 2, 3, and 4 were dismissed in 
exchange for that plea. Id. In addition, the State recommended, at the time of plea, "to 
recommend a concurrent sentence and 402(2) treatment upon successful completion of 
probation." Id. However, at sentencing, the State indicated that it was not aware of the 
defendant's federal record, and as such, would not abide by the plea agreement. R. 59. 
The trial court indicated to the defendant that he had the opportunity to withdraw his plea, 
and after consultation with counsel, defendant asked to proceed with sentencing and was 
sentenced to prison. Id. On June 21, 2010, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 46. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 14, 2010, the defendant entered a guilty plea to forgery, admitting that 
he passed a forged check at Andy's restaurant. R. 58:4. The State agreed to "recommend 
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402-2 treatment... upon successful completion of probation." R. 58:2. On November 22, 
2010, the defendant was sentenced by the trial court to a prison commitment. At 
sentencing, defense counsel informed the court of the State's recommendation of 402-2 
treatment. R. 59:2. Counsel asserted that Mr. McFarland's "criminal history ... may not 
warrant a prison commitment." R. 59:2. Admitting Mr. McFarland's involvement with 
the federal system, defense counsel indicated that Mr. McFarland's history consisted of 
"mostly misdemeanors." R. 59:2. Mr. McFarland had served six months in jail, and 
according to counsel, had a "very supportive family network" who "wanted to do what 
they could to help" him. R. 59:2-3. 
The court asked the State why it recommended probation when Mr. McFarland 
had "an extensive criminal history ... plus a prison commitment." R. 59:4. The State 
indicated it was unaware of the federal prison commitment and that "I wouldn't have 
done this if I had realized he had gone to federal prison." R. 59:4. The State then 
indicated that it would support the withdrawl of Mr. McFarland's plea. R. 59:4-5. The 
court agreed. R. 59:5. At this point, Mr. McFarland indicated that he "was under the 
assumption that I would get time served with possible probation" and that the AP&P 
officer told him that he would not "do prison time." R. 59:5. 
The court told Mr. McFarland that AP&P was recommending prison and then 
stated its own opinion: 
You have an extensive criminal history, including a prison commitment. I think 
based on that, I think it is a prison case, so if you want to withdraw your plea I'll 
allow you to do that. 
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R. 59:5. Mr. McFarland asked the court to consider a work release program, and the court 
stated that "based on the recommendation that's in front of me, I think it's a prison 
commitment case, so there would be no work release." R. 59:6. Again, the court stated, 
[I]t would be mind [sic] that you should go to prison, so if you feel that the 
other—that the previous negotiation was—that you made was predicated on 
having probation, then I'm willing to allow you to withdraw your plea and we'll 
set it for trial. It's your call. 
R. 59:7. Mr. McFarland asked the court how long a prison commitment would be and the 
court said that it didn't know, that defense counsel "might have a better feel" but that 
"there's presently a prison overcrowding, and that sentences are being shortened." R. 
59:7. 
At this point, Mr. McFarland conferred with defense counsel, who indicated "I 
guess we're still going forward." R. 59:7. Defense counsel stated: 
Mr. McFarland does have an extensive state history, it's you know, misdemeanors. 
He did have this one federal charge on which he served time with the Bureau of 
Prisons, but I think really that stemmed from basically a simultaneous state case, 
and the state handed it off to the feds in that regard. It was a drug case and 
possession of a firearm. Your Honor, I think Mr. McFarland has kind of gotten 
with the wrong people. I know that that happens to people that come into the 
court, but I think it's mixed up a lot of especially true for him. I think he could 
succeed, you know, on probation. I'm sure that he will succeed no matter what he 
does. Your Honor, I would just plead with you to give him a chance and let him do 
probation. 
R. 59:8. Mr. McFarland then stated: 
I just ask for the same, your Honor, if you can be fair and - I'd really like a 
chance to get out and work and get on with my life. I know I've made some 
mistakes, and I have been around the wrong people. I've had six months in Weber 
County to where I've gotten to get back in view of my life and what - in 
perspective of where I should be going and what I need to do. I don't feel that -
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I'd like to get out and work and get my life put back together, your Honor, and I 
just plead that you give me a chance. 
R. 59:8. 
The court noted that other than the 2004 prison commitment, Mr. McFarland 
appeared to have no other felony convictions. R. 59:8-9. The State indicated its reasoning 
for prison focused on the fact that "all criminals should understand that, 'Once I've been 
[to prison] I'm going to go back every time.'" R. 59:9. It also indicated that defendant 
failed federal probation. R. 59:9. 
Mr. McFarland attempted to clarify his federal sentence: 
On my federal probation I got three years probation, and I was fine. Two-
and-a-half years into it I changed jobs, and I was living in Bear Lake building 
homes, and my parole officer wasn't up there. It changed, I got a new parole 
officer, and they violated me because I switched jobs, and he said I wasn't in 
contact with him. I did the last six months in Davis County. 
I didn't have a lot of violations. I did really well in the federal court except 
for changing jobs and not — and he said that I didn't tell him, but we had a 
miscommunication, but I did terminate my federal parole in '08, and I didn't have 
— I just had the one violation, which was switching jobs. 
R. 59:10. The court commented on Mr. McFarland's unsuccessful termination of 
probation in 2004, which Mr. McFarland indicated that he did not even start. R. 59:10. It 
then indicated that he absconded after being released from prison. R. 59:10. Mr. 
McFarland denied that allegation. R. 59:10-11. The court indicated Mr. McFarland was 
sent back to prison and upon his release terminated his probation unsuccessfully. R. 
59:11. It then sentenced him to prison. R. 59:11. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court failed to consider all of the relevant mitigating factors before 
sentencing Mr. McFarland to prison. Specifically, and perhaps most grievously, the trial 
court pronounced a sentence without taking the opportunity to hear any evidence in 
mitigation. The court announced its sentence at the start of the proceeding, and though it 
allowed the defendant an opportunity to speak, the trial court clearly intended to send the 
defendant to prison despite anything he said or presented in mitigation. These errors 
constitute an abuse of discretion in sentencing and since they were not preserved by 
counsel, they may be reviewed for plain error and ineffective assistance. See Utah R. 
Crim. Pro. 22(a). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING MR, MCFARLAND TO PRISON 
The trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "The trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law." Bluff v. Utah, 2002 UT 66, f 66, 52 P.3d 1210 
(citations omitted). Further, the Due Process Clause "require[s] that a sentencing judge 
act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a 
sentence." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); see State v. Johnson, 856 
P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993). 
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"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of 
his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980). Although sentencing judges have "discretion in determining what punishment fits 
both the crime and the offender," Utah courts seek "to shore up the soundness and 
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that 
sentencing discretion." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980). 
Thus, a trial court does not have discretion to violate the defendant's due process 
"right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information regarding his crime, his 
background, and the interests of society." State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f34, 31 
P.3d 615, affd, State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, [^19, 79 P.3d 937 ("one purpose of the 
right to 711ocate . . . is to ensure that the judge is provided with reasonably reliable and 
relevant information regarding sentencing"); see State v. Sweat, 111 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 
1986) ("so long as basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural fairness 
are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in considering 'any and all information 
that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence'" (citation omitted)); State v. Lipsky, 608 
P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) ("fundamental fairness" requires that sentence be based 
only upon "accurate information"); State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) (court 
abuses its discretion if it bases sentence upon "wholly irrelevant, improper or 
inconsequential consideration"). 
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Information that is relevant to sentencing includes information related to the 
defendant's rehabilitation, punishment, incapacitation, restitution, and deterrence. See 
State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1997) ("The traditional justifications for 
punishment in the criminal law include retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation.'" (citation omitted)). 
In State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), for example, defendant was convicted 
of three counts of aggravated robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years 
before being sentenced. See GallU 967 P.2d at 932. On appeal, this Court held the trial 
court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences because: (1) defendant's 
crimes were "very serious crimes—all first degree felonies," but "the record show[ed] 
that [the trial court] may not have given adequate weight to certain mitigating 
circumstances," including the fact defendant "did not inflict any physical injuries," only 
used a "pellet gun," and took a "relatively small" amount of money; (2) defendant's 
history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction," 
and his act of absconding only provided "nominal support" since he was not charged with 
bail jumping; (3) although defendant's "offenses and flight from justice reflected] 
negatively on his character," he "voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility," 
"expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself," and, while in Minnesota, 
"obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a productive individual"; and (4) 
concurrent sentencing "better serve[ed]" his "rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board 
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of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine 
progress toward rehabilitation." Id. at 938. 
Applying the Galli factors to the case at hand, the trial court failed to give 
adequate weight to the mitigating factors at issue here. Mr. McFarland's offense involved 
passing a forged check. First, this was not a crime of violence of such a serious nature as 
to merit prison. See People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972) (finding that a 
20-year prison commitment for a non-violent crime violated the United States and 
Michigan constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment). At no point 
did Mr. McFarland hurt or injure another person. Like Galli, Mr. McFarland's case 
involved a relatively small amount of money—a check at a restaurant. The trial court 
paid no attention to this evidence in mitigation. Second, the defendant's state criminal 
history consisted only of misdemeanor offenses. His state criminal history, by the 
prosecutor's own admission, would not ordinarily carry a prison recommendation. See R. 
58:2. Additionally, the defendant's record contained only one felony conviction—a 2004 
federal prison commitment. R. 59:8-9. In fact, the State reasoned that Mr. McFarland 
ought to be returned to prison automatically—the prosecutor's opinion was that once 
someone had been to prison, he should always go back, no matter the circumstances. R. 
59:9. The trial court in this case gave little, or no, weight to the relatively minor nature of 
defendant's criminal history. Third, the defendant confessed readily to this offense, 
entered a guilty plea, and never denied responsibility. He took responsibility and 
indicated he had learned from this experience and that the six months of jail he did helped 
9 
him learn from his mistake. At no point did the trial court ever consider or weigh this 
evidence in mitigation. 
Additionally, however, and perhaps even more problematic, the trial court 
pronounced sentence before hearing any evidence in mitigation and seemed inclined to 
give prison no matter what evidence it heard. The court, when confronted with the State's 
probation recommendation asked why the State would give that recommendation when 
the defendant had "an extensive criminal history ... plus a prison commitment." R. 59:4. 
The court then told Mr. McFarland that 
You have an extensive criminal history, including a prison commitment. I think 
based on that, I think it is a prison case, so if you want to withdraw your plea I'll 
allow you to do that. 
R. 59:5. Again, the court stated, 
[I]t would be mind [sic] that you should go to prison, so if you feel that the 
other—that the previous negotiation was—that you made was predicated on 
having probation, then I'm willing to allow you to withdraw your plea and we'll 
set it for trial. It's your call. 
R. 59:7. 
After all of these pronouncements, the court proceeded into full sentencing where 
defense counsel and Mr. McFarland addressed the court. In other words, the court did not 
address evidence in mitigation until after it had already pronounced its intention. The 
sentencing hearing became a sham in which the court had already made its decision. 
Courts are prohibited from entering sentencing judgments until they have heard 
evidence in mitigation. See, Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22(a) ("Before imposing sentence the 
court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any 
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information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed."); State v. Wanosik 2003 UT 46, ^  21, 79 P.3d 937 ("We believe that the 
'shall afford' language in [Rule 22] requires the court to affirmatively provide the 
defense an opportunity to present mitigating information concerning sentencing."). 
The trial court is charged with identifying, on the record, the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances that affect its sentencing decision, because "sentencing 
should be conducted with full information and with careful deliberation of all 
relevant factors.1' State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993). A trial court's 
failure to discharge this duty will result in the case being remanded for 
resentencing with instructions that the trial court consider all of the circumstances 
relevant to the sentencing decision. See id.; 
State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200,% 10, 113 P.3d 992. See also Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 
633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (ordering prohibition after judge indicated his 
desire to give the defendant the maximum sentence before hearing mitigating evidence); 
Lewis v. State, 530 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (reversing sentence after trial judge 
announced that he would impose the maximum penalty if the case were tried); People v. 
Smice, 223 N.E.2d 548, 551 (111. App. 1967) ("Generally, trial courts cannot properly 
sentence offenders without a presentence or probationary report and without a hearing on 
aggravation and mitigation. Absent the information furnished thereby, reviewing courts 
are asked to make decisions in a vacuum.") 
In Gonzalez, the judge told defense counsel prior to sentencing that he intended to 
pronounce the maximum sentence. The court held that a 
trial judge's announced intention before a scheduled hearing to make a specific 
ruling, regardless of any evidence or argument to the contrary, is the paradigm of 
judicial bias and prejudice. We could not imagine a more telling basis for a party 
to fear that he will not receive a fair hearing. See Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 
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(Fla. 1986). Nor can we take seriously the state's response that in so announcing 
the judge "was merely doing his job" as commanded by our mandate. We 
instructed the judge to resentence within the guidelines. We did not, however, 
instruct him to impose the maximum sentence permitted by the guidelines. He was 
entirely free under our mandate to impose a period of punishment at the lowest 
end of the punishment scale. His announced intention to give the maximum 
regardless of anything from defendant cannot conceivably constitute mere 
compliance with our directions. 
Id. at 1184 (emphasis added). 
According to the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, "[a] judge shall accord to every 
person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be 
heard according to law." Rule 2.6(A). Additionally, a "judge shall uphold and apply the 
law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially." Rule 2.2. In this 
case, the judge over-valued the aggravating factors and failed to impartially consider the 
mitigating factors. 
While both defense counsel and the defendant were provided an opportunity to 
address the court, their arguments were largely perfunctory. The court stated its intention 
to impose prison before any evidence in mitigation was presented. The trial court argued 
with the defendant about his assertions which were contrary to its opinion. For example, 
Mr. McFarland denied being unsuccessfully terminated from probation and that he 
absconded. R. 59:10-11. The court merely heard the statement and immediately 
sentenced him to prison. The court had previously made up its mind that it would 
sentence the defendant to prison and it refused to listen to defendant's arguments or to 
consider any of the evidence in mitigation. 
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The trial court should have demonstrated impartiality and listened to all of the 
evidence before it, particularly the defendant's evidence in mitigation, before it reached a 
conclusion about the appropriate sentence. In this case, the trial court inappropriately 
made its decision prior to the introduction of mitigating evidence. 
Plain Error. The trial court's failure to consider mitigating evidence constitutes 
plain error. "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). "The 
preservation rule serves two important policies." Id. "First, 'in the interest of orderly 
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, 
if appropriate, correct it.'" Id. (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989)). 
"Second, a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of 'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
fails,. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse.'" Id. (citation omitted). "To 
serve these policies, [the Court] ha[s] held that the preservation rule applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred."/*/, (citations omitted). 
"The plain error exception enables the appellate court to 'balance the need for 
procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.'" Id. at [^13 (citation omitted). '"At 
bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the Court] to avoid injustice.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n 
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error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful... .'"Id. (citationomitted). 
As to the first prong, it clearly would be erroneous for court to fail to consider 
mitigating evidence as part of sentencing, as detailed infra pp. 6-13. 
As to the second prong, 
An error is obvious when "the law governing the error was clear at the time the 
alleged error was made.1' State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 16, 95 P.3d 276. An error 
may be obvious if a review of the plain language of the relevant statute reveals the 
error. See State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 41, 192 P.3d 867. Rule 22(a) of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires the court to allow the defendant the opportunity to present mitigating 
evidence. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 22(a). Additionally, as this court said in Moreno, failure 
to conduct a "careful deliberation" of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
warrants reversal of the sentence. State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, f 10, 113 P.3d 
992. Defendant contends that by announcing its decision at the outset, the trial court 
failed to conduct a careful deliberation, as mandated by the rules. 
As to the third prong, 
An error is harmful if it is "of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "This harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in 
assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,143, 192 P.3d 867. In this case, clearly a failure to adequately 
consider the defendant's evidence in mitigation, harmed his case, and like Moreno, 
requires reversal of the sentence. The trial court, had it conducted a more thorough 
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inquiry, could have more carefully balanced the evidence in favor of the defendant and 
against him. If Mr. McFarland were sentenced only according to the aggravating 
circumstances, which appears to be the case here, then his outcome would certainly have 
been different had the court considered evidence in mitigation. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must show that his counsel's "performance both falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and prejudices his client." Adams v. State, 2005 UT 
62, P 25, 123 P.3d 400 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 
must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a 
reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would 
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. To satisfy the first part of the test, 
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered 
adequate assistance. 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ^  22, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
The Ott case is particularly instructive. In that case, defense counsel failed to 
object to victim impact testimony which was presented at his sentencing hearing. The 
testimony surrounded the victims' feelings if Ott were to be released and their opinions as 
to his ability to be rehabilitated. Id. at lfi}26-32. The Supreme Court found these 
statements to be highly prejudicial and inadmissible in a sentencing hearing. Id. at \ 33. 
Counsel's failure to object to the admission of these statements constituted ineffective 
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assistance of counsel, partially because the United States Supreme Court had specifically 
prohibited this kind of testimony. "[I]f the evidence ha[s] no conceivable beneficial value 
to [the defendant], the failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy." Id. at % 
38, citing State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 42 (Utah 1996). 
In this case, the court's blanket statement that it would sentence the defendant to 
prison before it heard any evidence in mitigation clearly exceeds the court's allowable 
discretion. There would be "no conceivable beneficial value" for defense counsel's 
failure to object to the court's sentencing practices here. Because of this reason alone, 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient—no rational reason exists for counsel to 
allow the court to sentence a defendant without considering the mitigating evidence. 
Second, as detailed in the above section on plain error, had the court actually considered 
the mitigating evidence in this case: 1) that no violent offense occurred, 2) that the 
amount taken was minimal, 3) that defendant's criminal history consisted largely of 
misdemeanors, then there was a substantial likelihood that he would have received a 
probation sentence as opposed to a prison commitment. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's failures constitute an abuse of discretion, and as such, this matter 
ought to be reversed and remanded for a proper sentencing hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of J ^ ^ f H _ _ , 2011. 
2MQi 
P. NEWfOlT 
for the Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time 
for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or 
plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending 
sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause 
why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant 
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a 
warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence 
and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and 
the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of 
defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined 
in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a 
result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any 
firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for 
withdrawal of the plea. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting 
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true 
copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment 
and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at 
any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally 
ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 
77-16a-202(1)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
